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Abstract
This note extends the Bernardo, Talley & Welch (1999) model of pre-
sumptions to study situations where litigation efforts are spent sequentially
rather than simultaneously. The equilibria of the litigation stage are pre-
sented as functions of b. Two characteristics distinguish this case from the
simultaneous one. First, sequentiality allows the principal to pre-commit to a
litigation strategy, and thus possibly preempt litigation effort by both agent-
types. Second, while the description of the equilibria is more complex (and
must be divided into four regions of b), the comparative statics that emerge
are somewhat simpler than in the simultaneous case.
1 Introduction
This technical note solves the conflict model in Bernardo, Talley & Welch (1999),
but with sequential rather than simultaneous litigation expenditures by the plaintiff
and defendant, respectively. In particular, assume in what follows that if a principal
sues, she must first “make out a case” by presenting her evidence LP ahead of the
agent. Only after observing LP does the agent proceed to make his case in his own
defense (i.e., LHA or LLA, depending on his type).
2 A Conflict-Theory Model of Agency Costs
In this section, we develop a conflict-theory approach to characterize the role of
legal presumptions in a standard agency model. Our model begins with a simple
∗We thank Jiang Luo for many helpful comments.
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moral-hazard framework. However, once the agent has chosen an action, we intro-
duce an explicit litigation stage. The primary parameter of interest occurs within
this latter stage, in the form of a legal presumption specifying the manner in which
courts weigh and process each party’s proffered evidence so as to reach a deci-
sion. As we demonstrate in subsequent sections, the strength of the presumption
provides an important link between productive and redistributional incentives.
2.1 Framework
Consider a two-person game involving a principal (“she”) who hires an agent
(“he”) to provide labor for some productive enterprise (the “project”). In perform-
ing his duties, the agent is assumed to make a private, non-monitorable decision
about whether to expend high effort (eH) or low effort (eL). Although it costs the
agent nothing to expend low effort, high effort imposes on him a non-monetary
cost of φ dollars. Nevertheless, a high level of effort can benefit the principal, as
it affects the probability that the project realizes a high payoff (VH) instead of a
low payoff (VL, where VL <VH). In particular, the relationship between the agent’s
effort choice and the likelihood of project success is summarized in the following
table:
High (VH) Low (VL)
Effort p 1− p
No Effort 1− p p
(1)
The parameter p ∈ [1/2,1] captures the degree to which the agent’s effort can
affect prospective outcomes, with larger values representing a greater importance
of effort on the project’s success rate. In general, because p≥ 1/2, the principal—
who is the residual claimant on the project’s revenues—would always like the agent
to choose a high effort level. (From a societal standpoint, of course, effort is de-
sirable only if (2p− 1)(VH −VL) > φ). The principal observes only the project’s
outcome—she is unable to observe the agent’s actual effort choice directly.1
In most standard agency-cost models, the optimal contractual solution is to of-
fer incentive pay: i.e., the principal promises to pay the agent a bonus should the
project yield a high payoff. In contrast to this standard approach, we limit our
attention below to “fixed-wage” contracts, in which the agent receives a wage of
w regardless of the realized state, but may be subject to suit should a low project
payoff obtain. We motivate this assumption on a number of grounds. First, our
1We also assume that the agent’s effort is not verifiable (at least directly) in court. Nonetheless,
as we demonstrate below, the underlying evidentiary rule may act as an indirect means of verifying
the agent’s effort (at least probabilistically).
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principal focus concentrates on the use of default legal rules (rather than express
contract terms) as a means for providing optimal incentives for the agent. Although
such rules utilize “sticks” rather than “carrots” as the primary tool for achieving
incentive compatibility, an efficient default rule can substitute for express terms,
which themselves are often costly or difficult to draft.2 On a related note, so long
as express incentive contracts have at least some enforcement costs (e.g., they re-
quire that a court stand ready to verify whether a low or high state has obtained),
one can specify a default rule within our framework below that is an exact substi-
tute for an incentive contract. Finally, there are (for reasons outside our model) a
number of contract doctrines that are immutable in nature, and thus preclude pri-
vate parties from contracting around them.3 In such situations, litigation may be
the sole mechanism for enforcing contractual allocations.
Returning to our model, then, we assume that the agent receives a constant
wage w, but if a low state obtains the principal may file a lawsuit against the agent.
The lawsuit—if successful—would require the agent to pay money damages to the
principal. Accordingly, the extensive form of the game is as follows:
[INSERT EXTENSIVE FORM HERE]
The figure presupposes that the agent has been offered and accepted a contract
paying him a specified wage, w, which satisfies his participation constraint. The
agent is first to move, deciding whether to expend high or low effort in performing
his duties. Next, Nature determines whether the project yields a high or a low pay-
off, according to the probabilities associated with the agent’s effort choice. Should
the project yield a high payoff, the game immediately ends, with the high-effort
agent type receiving a payoff of w−φ, the low-effort agent type receiving a payoff
of w,and the principal receiving a payoff of VH −w.
Should a low payoff obtain, the principal may choose whether to file suit
against the agent. If she decides not to sue (NS), then the game similarly ends
2There is a growing literature on the costs of express contracting, costs that emanate from prob-
lems of (among other things) bounded rationality, multi-tasking concerns, complexity, and intra-
organizational political concerns. See, e.g., Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991, 1994); MacLeod (1998);
Jensen & Murphy (1990).
3A number of statutes make certain types of contracts invalid. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1668
(1999) (voiding as unlawful all contracts that exempt anyone from responsibility for fraud, willful
injury of another, or violation of law). In some jurisdictions, this trend appears to be continuing.
See, e.g., California Assembly Bill 858, 1999 CA A.B. 858 (voiding, as against public policy, all
contracts in which consumers or employees consent to binding arbitration, waive their right to rescind
a contract during a statutory cooling-off period, or waive their rights to a jury trial). In this paper,
however, we do not attempt to provide a reason for immutable rules, other than to recognize that they
exist in many circumstances.
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with the high-effort agent, low-effort agent and the principal, respectively, receiv-
ing payoffs of w− φ, w, and VL−w. If, on the other hand, the principal decides
to sue (S), the players enter an end game of litigation, in which a court must de-
cide whether to find the agent liable. Should liability be found, the agent must
pay D dollars to the principal, an amount representing the applicable damages for
the complaint in question.4 While such prospective recovery is attractive to the
principal, litigation does not come without costs. Indeed, in order simply to bring
suit, the principal must incur a non-recoverable fixed cost F > 0 to draft and file
a complaint. Thus, only if the expected net payoffs from litigation are sufficiently
large to cover these fixed costs would a rational principal ever choose to file suit.5
Once invoked, litigation may impose additional variable costs on both parties
as they argue the case in court. In particular, we conceive of litigation as a re-
distributional conflict game, wherein parties expend “litigation effort” producing
and presenting evidence before a judge or jury. Let LP ≥ 0 denote the amount of
incriminating evidence the principal chooses to present against the agent in litiga-
tion. Similarly, let LLA ≥ 0 and LHA ≥ 0 denote the amount of exculpatory evidence
the low-effort and high-effort agent types, respectively, choose to offer in their own
defense. Following the usual rules of civil procedure, assume that the players’ de-
cisions in the litigation game are sequential, with the principal first presenting her
case-in-chief followed by the agent who presents his defense.6
The litigation strategies, LP, LLA , and LHA , are intended to summarize the efforts
that litigants routinely expend to gather and present evidence to a court (such as
eye-witness testimony, expert opinions, documentary evidence, laboratory tests,
and the like). Importantly, we make no specific assumption about the inherent
truthfulness of either side’s evidence. Indeed, it may be genuine and contrived;
unrehearsed or completely orchestrated. All that we require is that the evidence
be costly on the margin for both parties to produce. In particular, we assume that
the principal faces a (constant) marginal litigation cost of cP > 0 to present LP, so
that his total evidentiary cost is cPLP. The agent also bears a (constant) marginal
cost of presenting evidence, but we allow the agent’s cost to depend on his type
(i.e., prior effort level). If the agent expended high effort, his marginal litigation
cost is cHA > 0, and thus his total evidentiary cost is cHA LHA . If he expended low
4In order to concentrate on the role played by legal presumptions, we treat D as exogenous in
what follows, assuming only that it is “large” enough to have a potential deterrent effect on the
agent. See Section 2.5, infra. In principle, it is possible to generalize the model to allow for suit in
either realized state of the world. Doing so, however, adds considerable complication to the analysis
without many added insights. We have therefore omitted such an analysis in what follows.
5It is easy to demonstrate that the principal will always file a complaint if F = 0. Thus, we limit
our attention to the (more realistic) case of F > 0.
6It is also possible to model the litigation game as simultaneous, and similar results emerge. See
Bernardo, Talley & Welch (1999).
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effort, his marginal litigation cost is cLA > 0, and thus his total evidentiary cost is
cLALLA. We assume in what follows that cLA > cHA ; i.e., shirking agents find it more
costly to produce exculpatory evidence than do their high-effort counterparts.7 We
justify this assumption by observing that shirkers must (almost by definition) offer
evidence that is inconsistent with their actual behavior. As such, producing such
evidence may necessitate exhaustive searches, more intensive coaching of friendly
witnesses, and perhaps even the payment of explicit or implicit bribes in exchange
for false testimony.8 As will become apparent below, this cost differential implies
that shirking agents will rationally choose to present less evidence than their non-
shirking counterparts in equilibrium. Consequently, the litigation effort expended
by the agent may be an efficiency-enhancing signal of her type—a signal that is
only possible when litigation occurs along the equilibrium path.
Finally, in order to understand why the parties would even bother to expend
litigation effort, it is important to specify how evidence presentation affects judicial
findings of liability. To this end, let q(LP,L jA) denote the “legal rule” employed by
the court, which maps the players’ litigation efforts into the probability that the
agent is found liable, with j ∈ {L,H}. (Alternatively, it is possible to interpret q(.)
as the fraction of some maximal damages amount D that the principal receives).
In order to develop more concrete intuitions (and to remain consistent with the
conflict-theory literature9), we adopt a particular functional form for q(.), in which
the principal’s success probability is:
q j ≡ q(LP,L jA) =
LP
bL jA + LP
⇐⇒
(
q(LP,L jA)
1−q(LP,L jA)
)
=
LP
b ·L jA
(2)
for j = L,H. (To economize on notation, in what follows we will often denote
q(LP,L
j
A) simply as q j). The parameter b > 0 denotes the ex ante “weight” that
a court accords the agent’s proffered evidence relative to the principal’s, thereby
representing the role of a legal presumption. Moreover, by varying the value of b
it is possible to consider a range of potential presumptions, from a conclusive (or
“irrebuttable”) presumption favoring the principal (b = 0) to a conclusive presump-
tion favoring the defendant (b = ∞), and all (theoretically rebuttable) presumptions
in between (0< b< ∞).10
7Although we assume constant marginal costs, most of the core arguments presented below carry
over to the case in which the marginal cost of evidence production increases in litigation effort (so
long as the low-effort agent’s cost schedule is uniformly higher than that of the high-effort agent).
8Similar assumptions appear in Rubinfeld & Sappington (1987), Sanchirico (1998) and Daughety
& Reinganum (1998). Daughety and Reinganum motivate their assumption a phenomenon of costly
evidentiary search by “guilty” defendants.
9E.g., Hirshleifer (1995).
10There are other possible evidientiary interpretations of the b parameter. For example, a judicial
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This functional form exhibits a number of useful and intuitive properties.11
First, note that it is increasing in LP and decreasing in L jA: greater litigation effort by
either party ceteris paribus increases her likelihood of prevailing (or alternatively,
her share of the surplus available for redistribution). Moreover, it is possible for
either party—holding her opponent’s action constant—to choose a level of litiga-
tion that realizes the entire range of success probabilities between 0 and 1. Finally,
as the two parties’ litigation levels tend uniformly to zero, the limiting probability
of plaintiff success is 1/(1 + b),which one might interpret as the court’s default
presumption—i.e., its ex ante bias in the absence of any production of evidence.12
3 Equilibrium Behavior
Given the fundamentals of the game, we may now proceed to analyze the plausible
equilibria that emerge from non-cooperative play. Our equilibrium concept in what
follows is sequential equilibrium (Kreps & Wilson 1982), though even weaker
equilibrium concepts would do as well.13 Denote the probability that the agent
expends high effort by β, and the probability that the principal brings an action
in a low state by γ. Accordingly, the strategy profile (β∗, γ∗, L ∗P , LL∗A , LH ∗A ) is
part of a sequential equilibrium for the game if no player-type has an affirmative
incentive to deviate from her prescribed strategy given her beliefs at each stage,
and if all players’ beliefs at each information set are consistent and sequentially
rational. We solve the game in reverse order, starting with the litigation contest,
then inducting backwards to the principal’s decision about whether to file suit, and
bias toward a litigant may manifest itself in the relative frequency with which the court deems one
party’s evidentiary offerings inadmissibile. A pro-plaintiff court may tend to admit virtually all of a
plaintiff’s offers of proof, while admitting the defendant’s only 70 percent of the time. Such a bias
would be reflected by setting b = 0.7.
11In addition to those listed in the text, Skaperdas (1996) shows that this functional form also has
some desirable axiomatic properties in other contexts, such as a monotonic improvement in outcome
when more resources are expended. The only other known conflict paramaterization that satisfies
such properties (exponential) leads to corner solutions.
12Explicitly, limL→0 q(L,L) = 1/(1 + b). As a formal matter, of course, legal rules on burdens of
production may look slightly different. The conventional description (e.g., Fuller (1967)) appears to
be one of an absolute (rather than probabilistic) presumption, which oscillates between the plaintiff
and defendant ad seriatim as each meets her burden of evidence production to overcome it. It is pos-
sible to capture such intuition by either assuming a more elaborate sequence of evidence production,
or (in what may be a limiting case) assuming simultaneous actions. Such permutations appear not to
alter our qualitative results. See Bernardo, Talley & Welch (1999).
13In particular, the set of equilibria described below is also the set of perfect bayesian equilibria
(PBE), an equilibrium concept that does not require consistency in beliefs. The distinction between
PBE and sequential equilibrium is non-existent for this model, as all relevant information sets are
reached with positive probability.
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finally to the agent’s ex ante decision about whether to expend effort.
3.1 Litigation Stage
To analyze the final, litigation stage of the game, assume that a low state of the
world has come about and that the principal has chosen to file suit. Let α denote
the principal’s belief that the agent has previously expended a high level of effort
if the low state occurs.14 The endogenous levels of litigation activity LLA,LHA , and
LP will generally depend on α, and are characterized below.
First consider the agent’s choice of litigation level, having observed the prin-
cipal’s choice LP. Because the agent knows how much effort he has previously
put forth, his choice will generally depend on his type. For the agent type who
previously put forth high effort (eH), the problem is to solve:
max
LHA≥0
[
LP
bLHA + LP
]
· (−D)− cHA LHA . (3)
Assuming an interior solution,15 the following first-order condition characterizes
the high-effort agent’s best response to LP16:(
bLP
(bLHA + LP)2
)
·D = cHA . (4)
For an agent who put forth low effort (eL), the analogous problem is:
max
LLA≥0
[
LP
bLLA + LP
]
· (−D)− cLALLA. (5)
Assuming an interior solution, the relevant first-order condition is:(
bLP
(bLLA + LP)2
)
·D = cLA. (6)
The conditions (4) and (6) embody the intuition that a each agent type will expend
litigation costs up to the point where the marginal benefit of reducing his expected
14Though α should be treated as exogenous at this stage, sequential rationality requires its value
to be related to the agent’s equilibrium effort choice β via Bayes rule. This constraint is taken up at
length infra in subsection 2.5.
15It turns out that an interior solution for the high-effort agent need not exist. In particular, his
optimal choice is interior if and only if b> αc
H
A
2cP .
16In this case, as in the others, sufficiency is satisfied by the strict concavity of the objective
function in LP.
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liability is equal to the marginal cost of litigation effort. Note that these conditions
(if satisfied at equality) imply that qi =
√
ciALP
bD , for i = L,H.
We now move backwards in the sequence to consider the principal’s choice
of litigation effort. Having already sunk the fixed cost of bringing suit, the prin-
cipal’s expected payoff from litigation consists of damages she can expect (i.e.,
[αqH + (1−α)qL] ·D) less her variable costs of litigation (cPLP). Thus, given the
respective agent types’ litigation levels, the principal’s optimization problem solves
the following:
max
Lp≥0
[
α
(
LP
bLHA + LP
)
+(1−α)
(
LP
bLLA + LP
)]
·D− cPLP. (7)
Substituting the agent-types’ optimality conditions from (4) and (6) (again assum-
ing that interior solutions obtain) and differentiating gives the following first-order
condition for the principal:
1
2
√
D
LP ·b
(
α
√
cHA +(1−α)
√
cLA
)
= cP. (8)
As with the agent, this condition states that the principal will increase her litigation
efforts (LP) until the marginal private benefits from doing so are just equal to the
marginal private costs.
If both agents’ optimal choices are interior, the unique equilibrium of the con-
tinuation game can be found by solving (8), (4), and (6) simultaneously. Unfortu-
nately, such a solution exists only if the underlying presumption b is sufficiently
large to induce both agent types to put up a defense in equilibrium.17 When b is
relatively small, (indicating a relatively strong pro-plaintiff presumption), one or
both of the agent types may find it optimal simply to fold and not present any ev-
idence (i.e., Li∗A = 0 for i = L,H). Accounting for these considerations yields the
following lemma (whose proof can be found in the appendix):
Lemma 1 The equilibrium litigation efforts of the principal and the two agent
17In particular, it is easily confirmed that a fully interior solution requires b ≥(
α
√
cHA +(1−α)
√
cLA
2cP
)√
cLA.
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types in b−space (along with the equilibrium probabilities of liability) are:
Interval L∗P LH∗A LL∗A q∗H q∗L
b ∈ B4 D·µ
2
4b
D·µ
2b ·
[
1√
cHA
− µ2b
]
D·µ
2b ·
[
1√
cLA
− µ2b
]
µ
√
cHA
2b
µ
√
cLA
2b
b ∈ B3 b·DcLA
D√
cLA
·
[
1√
cHA
− 1√
cLA
]
0
√
cHA
cLA
1
b ∈ B2 D·µ
2
4b
D·µ
2b ·
[
1√
cHA
− µ2b
]
0 µ
√
cHA
2b 1
b ∈ B1 b·DcHA 0 0 1 1
where µ ≡
(
α
√
cHA
cP
)
and µ ≡
(
α
√
cHA +(1−α)
√
cLA
cP
)
, and B1 ≡
[
0, 12 µ
√
cHA
)
, B2 ≡[
1
2 µ
√
cHA ,
1
2 µ
√
cLA
)
, B3 ≡
[
1
2 µ
√
cLA,
1
2 µ
√
cLA
)
, and B4 ≡
[
1
2 µ
√
cLA,∞
)
.
Notice that the only fully-interior equilibrium of the litigation game occurs
when b ∈ B4, an interval in which the underlying presumptions accords the defen-
dant (of either type) sufficient leverage to make it worthwhile to attempt a defense.
In any other interval, either the low-effort defendant or both types of defendant are
at corner solutions, and therefore present no exculpatory evidence. Moreover, since
a defendant who fails to mount any defense loses with probability one, there are no
“false negatives” (i.e., low-effort defendants who are nonetheless exonerated) in
{B1,B2,B3}—only “false positives” (high-effort defendants who are nonetheless
found liable). Interval B4 is the only one in which there is a meaningful tradeoff
between overinclusive and underinclusive legal rules (and thus B4 will receive most
of our attention below).
Inspection and/or piecewise differentiation of the above expressions yields the
following results for the principal:
Lemma 2 The principal’s equilibrium litigation level, L∗P, is increasing in D, and
is globally maximal at either b = 12 µ
√
cHA or at b = 12 µ
√
cLA.
Note from the lemma that the principal is more likely to sue if, ceteris paribus,
there is more at stake (i.e., D is large). One would expect this tendency, since the
marginal value of litigation effort increases in D and the marginal costs are invariant
to D. Furthermore, note that there is an interior b that induces the principal to be
most litigious. This also comports with intuition: for when the principal has a
conclusive edge (as is the case when b is extremely low), she need not expend
much effort to challenge the plaintiff; conversely, when the agent has a conclusive
edge (as when b is extremely high), it is futile for the principal to expend much on
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litigation, since she is likely to lose regardless. Only at an intermediate value of b
are the parties chances of prevailing roughly commensurate. It is here, then, where
the principal (and the agent) tend to be most aggressive in litigation (see Welch
(1998)).
Analogously, a similar set of results can be obtained for both the high-effort
and the low-effort agent types:
Lemma 3 The high-effort agent’s equilibrium litigation level, LH∗A , is equal to zero
for all b ∈ {B1}. For all b ∈ {B2,B3,B4}, LH∗A is positive, strictly increasing in D,
strictly greater than the low-effort agent’s equilibrium litigation level, LL∗A . Finally,
• If cHA > c
L
A
4 , then L
H∗
A is maximal at b = µ
√
cHA ;
• If cHA < c
L
A
4 , then L
H∗
A is maximal at b = µ
√
cHA ;
• If cHA = c
L
A
4 , then L
H∗
A is maximal ∀ b ∈ {B3}.
Lemma 4 The low-effort agent’s equilibrium litigation level, LL∗A ,is equal to zero
for all b ∈ {B1,B2,B3}. For all b ∈ {B4}, LL∗A is strictly positive and increasing in
D. Finally, LL∗A is maximal at b = µ
√
cLA.
Like principals, agents are more inclined to defend themselves if more is at
stake (D is large) and if their net “power” (taking into account judicial presump-
tions and costs of litigation) is roughly commensurate with that of the principal.
Note that both the principal’s and the agent’s actions depend on the principal’s
equilibrium assessment that the agent has exerted effort (α). Although we treat
α as exogenous for current purposes, subsequent sections will make clear that the
principal’s beliefs may be sensitive along the equilibrium path to variations in the
value of b (i.e., a larger b tends to reduce agent effort, which in turn reduces the
principal’s Bayesian assessment of the agent’s culpability).
It is also important to note that in all but interval B1 (where neither agent type
mounts a defense), the high-effort agent is a more aggressive litigator than is his
shirking counterpart. This difference in litigiousness is an artifact of the marginal
cost differences faced by the two agent types (i.e., cHA < cLA). Once suit is filed, the
high-effort agent finds it relatively cheap to mount a defense, and therefore presents
more evidence (and wins more often) than does the low-effort agent.
3.2 Filing Stage
With the equilibrium litigation levels in hand, we now step backwards to analyze
the principal’s filing decision. Should the principal sue, she expects to receive the
10
payoffs from litigation stage described above, but must pay the fixed costs F of
bringing an action. Consequently, the principal will sue only if the former exceeds
the latter. (Because the principal’s beliefs are constrained to be sequentially ra-
tional, she must still conjecture at this stage that there is an α-probability that the
agent had previously given effort).
If the principal chooses not to litigate, she simply pays the agent the contracted
wage, and thus her low-state payoff is:
piP(NS;α) = VL−w. (9)
Conversely, if the principal files suit, her expected payoff is:
piP(S;α) = VL−w +[α ·q∗H +(1−α) ·q∗L] ·D− cPL∗P−F. (10)
Let RP(α) ≡ piP(S;α)− piP(NS;α) denote the net gain the principal expects
to receive from suing over abstaining. Clearly, the principal will always abstain
from litigating (i.e., set γ = 0) if RP(α) < 0, and will always file suit (i.e., set
γ = 1) if RP(α) > 0. When RP(α) = 0, however, the principal is indifferent, and
would be willing to adopt any γ∈ [0,1].Using the reduced-form litigation strategies
specified above, it is possible to derive the following lemma about the principal’s
filing decision (whose proof can be found in the appendix):
Lemma 5 The principal’s net expected gain from filing suit, RP(α), is continuous
and strictly decreasing in b, strictly decreasing in α in regions B4,B3,B2, and flat
in α in region B1. Moreover, holding α fixed, RP(α) is strictly increasing in D, and
strictly decreasing in cP and F.
The fact that RP(α) decreases in α is not surprising. Indeed, a marginal increase
in α implies that the principal believes it more likely that the agent had previously
expended effort. Because high-effort agents are more effective litigators than are
their shirking counterparts, one would expect the principal’s net expected benefits
from filing suit to decrease (as the lemma confirms). From similar logic, as the
stakes involved in the suit (D) increase, the principal’s incentive to sue is analo-
gously enhanced; but, as either the filing fees (F), the marginal cost of litigation
(cP), or the court’s pro-agent bias (b) increase, suit becomes less attractive to the
principal.
3.3 Effort Stage
Consider now the agent’s ex ante effort choice, anticipating the subsequent equi-
librium behavior characterized above. Recall that γ denotes the probability that the
principal litigates. Accordingly, the agent’s expected payoff from high effort is:
11
piA(eH ;γ) = w− γ(1− p)(q∗HD + cHA LH
∗
A )−φ. (11)
Conversely, the agent’s expected payoff from low effort is:
piA(eL;γ) = w− γp(q∗LD + cLALL
∗
A ). (12)
In what follows, let RA(γ)≡ piA(eH ;γ)−piA(eL;γ) denote the net gain the agent
expects from expending higher effort. The agent always shirks if RA(γ) < 0, and
always expends effort if RA(γ)> 0. When RA(γ) = 0, the agent will be indifferent,
and thus willing to mix over high and low effort levels. From the reduced forms
specified above, it is possible to derive the following lemma about the agent’s effort
decision:
Lemma 6 The agent’s net expected gain from expending productive effort, RA(γ),
is continuous and strictly increasing in γ ∀γ ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, holding α and γ
fixed, RA(γ) is strictly increasing in D and p, and strictly decreasing in φ.
Similar to the arguments above, an increase in the value γ implies that the agent
becomes increasingly convinced of the principal’s threat to file suit should a low
state obtain. Because suit involves both the prospect of damages and litigation
costs (which are higher on the margin for a shirking agent), the agent has a greater
incentive to expend effort, which both minimizes the likelihood of a low state and
enhances the agent’s ability to defend against suit. Analogously, the agent’s in-
centive to expend effort increase with the stakes involved in the suit (D) and the
importance of the agent’s effort (p). On the other hand, as the immediate cost of
effort (φ) increases, high effort becomes less attractive to the agent.
3.4 Equilibrium
As noted above, we employ the notion of sequential equilibrium to predict rational
play of the game. Having computed the equilibrium litigation levels of all player
types (i.e., L ∗P , LL
∗
A , LH
∗
A ), all that remains is to specify behavior strategies (β∗,γ∗)
implied by the expressions above, and a belief structure for the principal (α∗) that
is consistent and sequentially rational. Because each of the principal’s relevant
information sets is reached with positive probability in this game, consistency is
trivially established. Regarding sequential rationality, Bayes’ Rule requires that the
agent’s behavior strategy (β) and the principal’s beliefs (α) be related as follows18:
α =
(1− p)β
(1− p)β + p(1−β)
18Or equivalently, β = pαpα+(1−p)(1−α) .
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Rather than articulating all of the equilibria that can emerge from this model,
it is perhaps more instructive to consider a subset of the parameter space that man-
ifests the principal qualitative equilibrium characteristics that we observe through-
out.19 As noted above, we are particularly interested in those cases for which the
underlying presumption can have both over- and under-inclusive tendencies (i.e.,
false negatives and false positives). Accordingly, we shall hereinafter restrict our
equilibrium analysis to parameter values satisfying the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1 F ≤ D2 ·
cHA
cLA
.
Assumption 2 φ≤ (2p−1) ·D ·
(
cHA
cLA
) 3
2
[
2−
(
cHA
cLA
) 3
2
]
Assumption 1 requires that the fixed costs of filing (F) be small enough to
ensure that the principal has the incentive to file suit in the event of a low state
(at least with a relatively pro-plaintiff presumption). Analogously, Assumption 2
requires that agent’s cost of productive effort (φ) be sufficiently small (under a
relatively pro-plaintiff presumption) to make effort worthwhile if the agent knows
that litigation is certain in a bad state (γ = 1). Note that both assumptions are
satisfied whenever the applicable amount of damages (D) is sufficiently large.20
Under these assumptions, the equilibria of the model fall conveniently into the
three regions pictured below, corresponding to strong pro-plaintiff presumptions
(Region I), intermediate presumptions (Region II), and strong pro-defendant pre-
sumptions (Region III), respectively.
Region I:
Strong
Pro-Plaintiff
Presumptions
Region II:
Intermediate
Presumptions
Region III:
Strong
Pro-Defendant
Presumptions
b≤ b≡ D4F ·
cHA
cP
b< b< ¯b b≥ ¯b≡ D4F ·
cLA
cP
19For readers interested in a full description of the equilibria please consult the Appendix.
20More generally, a sufficiently large value of D is necessary for our problem to be an interesting
one. For example, consider the extreme case where F < D, so that damages cannot even cover
the fixed costs of filing. Here, Region III is the only viable region, and the unique equilibrium
involves shirking by the agent and abstention by the prinipal. The legal presumption is irrelevant.
Alternatively, consider the case where φ < (2p− 1) ·D, so that damages are so small as to have
no deterrent effect on the agent (even for the most potent pro-principal rule). Once again, in such
a situation the agent will always choose to shirk regardless of the evidentiary presumption b. (Our
Assumptions 1 and 2 are slightly more restrictive than these for expositional reasons, as they ensure
that any corner solutions of the litigaiton game occur only for relatively “extreme” presumptions in
Region I—i.e., that Region II and Region III are wholly within interval B4).
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The boundaries of these regions correspond to the critical values of b at which
the presumption has a dispositive effect on the principal’s litigation strategy—i.e.,
in Region I, the pro-plaintiff presumption is so strong that the principal would al-
ways sue, regardless of her beliefs about the agent’s prior behavior; in Region III, in
contrast, the pro-defendant presumption is so strong that the principal would never
sue, regardless of her equilibrium beliefs; finally, within Region II the underlying
presumption is relatively moderate, so that the principal’s litigation strategy turns
critically on her beliefs about the agent’s prior behavior. So long as Assumptions
1 and 2 are satisfied, all three regions described in the table above contain unique
sequential equilibria. We address each region below (albeit in a slightly inverted
order).
Strong Pro-Defendant Presumptions: b ∈ [¯b,∞). In Region III, the agent ben-
efits from a pro-defendant presumption that is sufficiently strong to deter the prin-
cipal altogether from filing suit, regardless of her equilibrium beliefs. Thus, any
equilibrium in this region must prescribe that the principal employs a pure strategy
of abstaining from suing. Without fear of suit, one would also expect the agent to
pursue a pure strategy of shirking, a result embodied in the following proposition21:
Proposition 1 If b ∈ [¯b,∞), then there exists a unique sequential equilibrium in
pure strategies with β∗ = 0, γ∗ = 0, and α∗ = 0. The equilibrium litigation
levels L ∗P , LL
∗
A and LH
∗
A are given in the first row of the table from Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 is in many ways quite intuitive. It states that if the pro-agent legal
presumption, b, grows sufficiently large, the prospects from suit are not enough to
cover the principal’s fixed cost of filing, F. Consequently, the principal poses no
credible threat to file suit. Knowing this, the agent is undeterred from shirking, and
therefore always expends low levels of effort.22 The social cost of this equilibrium,
then, consists solely of the costs imposed by sub-optimal effort.
Strong Pro-Plaintiff Presumptions: b ∈ [0,b]. Consider now the opposite case
in Region I, where a court adheres to a strong pro-plaintiff presumption. Here,
the principal has such a clear upper hand in litigation that she always files suit
regardless of her beliefs about the agent type she faces. So long as damages impose
a sufficiently strong deterrent effect (as embodied by Assumption 1), one can show
21This proposition is simply stated without proof.
22Note also that if a court were free to choose damages as well, D, it could effect the same outcome
by specifying small or zero damages (and thus Region III would effectively span all of b-space).
Equivalently, this proposition does not depend on either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2.
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that the agent also follows a pure strategy of expending effort. This argument is
illustrated in the following proposition:23
Proposition 2: If b ∈ [0,b] and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exists a
unique sequential equilibrium in pure strategies with β∗ = 1, γ∗ = 1, and
α∗ = 1. The equilibrium litigation strategies are given by Lemma 1, and
depend on the precise value of b.
So long as effort is socially desirable, the equilibrium social waste in Region I
consists only of the costs due to litigation. An important consideration within this
subregion is the limiting case where b = 0. Here, the pro-principal presumption is
sufficiently inviolate that agent can never prevail in litigation, and thus essentially
the principal need only pay the filing fee F to collect damages. Thus, b = 0 reflects
a form of strict liability rule favoring the plaintiff. Perhaps more illustratively, such
a rule is the doctrinal equivalent of an ordinary incentive contract, paying the agent
w in the high state and w−D in the low state (though one that costs the principal
F to invoke should the low state obtain).
Intermediate Presumptions: b ∈ (b, ¯b). Finally, consider what is perhaps the
most observationally familiar region, in which the legal presumption is not preclu-
sive in equilibrium, and thus each side has a legitimate prospect of prevailing.
Region II is also the most interesting from a game-theoretic perspective, because it
entails equilibria in mixed-strategies, and thus the agent randomizes between work-
ing hard and shirking, while the principal randomizes between suit and abstention.
This statement is formalized in the following proposition:24
Proposition 3 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exists a
unique equilibrium in mixed strategies with β∗ ∈ (0,1), γ∗ ∈ (0,1) and α∗ ∈
(0,1). The equilibrium litigation levels L ∗P , LL
∗
A and LH
∗
A are given in the first
row of the table from Lemma 1.
That mixed strategy equilibria characterize Region II should not be terribly
surprising, as it is a common result in asymmetric information models of auditing.
To understand the core intuition, consider the agent’s best response in this region
if he conjectured that the principal would never sue. Undeterred by the spectre of
legal action, the agent would never give effort. In response, however, the principal
would always sue, which in turn would induce the agent to work hard rather than
23The proof of this proposition appears in the Appendix.
24The proof of this proposition appears in the Appendix.
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shirk. This cycling iteration of best responses implies that the only equilibrium in
Region II must be in mixed strategies, as stated in the proposition.
Perhaps of greater interest in this subregion are the comparative statics on the
players’ equilibrium effort and suit strategies, (β∗ and γ∗) as b changes. Implicit
differentiation of the principal’s and agent’s best response functions25 yields the
following:
Proposition 4 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the agent’s equilibrium
effort strategy β∗ is strictly decreasing in b, and the principal’s equilibrium
filing strategy γ∗ is strictly increasing in b for all p ∈ [pˆ,1] where pˆ ∈ [12 ,1).
The intuition behind this Proposition is as follows. Consider first the marginal
impact of increasing b on the agent’s equilibrium effort choice β∗. As the agent’s
power increases, he becomes increasingly effective at fending off litigation—a
source of confidence that leads him to shirk more often in equilibrium. One might
similarly conjecture that increasing b would have the opposite effect on the princi-
pal’s filing strategy—i.e., facing a presumption that is slightly more biased in favor
of the agent, the principal would be less likely to file suit in the event of a bad
state. Surprisingly, however, this is not what we find. Rather, the above proposi-
tion states that increasing b actually enhances principal’s proclivity to litigate in
the low state. On first blush, this is a surprising result: all else equal, larger val-
ues of b should reduce the principal’s expected payoff from filing. This reasoning,
however, fails to account for the fact that in equilibrium, a larger b also induces
the agent to reduce his effort in the primary activity. Knowing this, the principal is
more confident that the agent’s shirking has contributed to the realization of a low
state, which increases her incentive to sue. When Assumptions 1 and 2 are satis-
fied, this indirect equilibrium more than offsets the direct incentive effect, thereby
leading to a a greater likelihood of suit when a low state occurs.
A number of corollaries are direct implications of Proposition 4. Three of them,
however, deserve particular attention:
Corollary 4.1 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the likelihood of a false
positive (high-effort defendant is found liable, i.e. q∗H) is decreasing in b.
Corollary 4.2 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the likelihood of a false
negative (low-effort defendant is not found liable, i.e. 1− q∗L) is increasing
in b.
25Because the unique sequential equilibrium is in mixed strategies, it is characterized by the equa-
tions RP(α∗) = 0 and RA(γ∗) = 0, embodying indifference expressions of the principal’s and agent’s
best-response functions. Proposition reports comparative statics on this system.
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Corollary 4.3 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the ex ante probability
of suit is increasing in b for sufficiently large p.
Corollary 4.4 If b∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the unconditional prob-
ability plaintiff victory at trial does not vary with b.
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5 Appendix:
5.1 Litigation Effort Lemma
Lemma 1 The equilibrium litigation efforts of the principal and the two agent
types in b−space (along with the equilibrium probabilities of liability) are:
Interval L∗P LH∗A LL∗A q∗H q∗L
b ∈ B4 D·µ
2
4b
D·µ
2b ·
[
1√
cHA
− µ2b
]
D·µ
2b ·
[
1√
cLA
− µ2b
]
µ
√
cHA
2b
µ
√
cLA
2b
b ∈ B3 b·DcLA
D√
cLA
·
[
1√
cHA
− 1√
cLA
]
0
√
cHA
cLA
1
b ∈ B2 D·µ
2
4b
D·µ
2b ·
[
1√
cHA
− µ2b
]
0 µ
√
cHA
2b 1
b ∈ B1 b·DcHA 0 0 1 1
where µ ≡
(
α
√
cHA
cP
)
and µ ≡
(
α
√
cHA +(1−α)
√
cLA
cP
)
, and B1 ≡
[
0, 12 µ
√
cHA
)
,
B2 ≡
[
1
2 µ
√
cHA ,
1
2 µ
√
cLA
)
, B3 ≡
[
1
2 µ
√
cLA,
1
2 µ
√
cLA
)
, and B4 ≡
[
1
2 µ
√
cLA,∞
)
.
Proof: In interval B4, the equilibrium strategies are found simply by solving the
players’ first order conditions (8), (4), and (6) simultaneously. It is easily confirmed
within this interval that the proposed strategies constitute an interior solution for
all player-types.
Outside of interval B4, however, the low-effort agent’s non-negativity con-
straint binds, and the solution proposed is not valid. Any such solution must
place the low-effort agent at a corner solution of LL∗A = 0. In selecting her strat-
egy, though, the principal may not be able simply to ignore the low-effort agent
and optimize against the high agent. Indeed, if the principal adjusts her strategy to
focus solely on the high-effort agent, the low-effort agent may enter the fray again.
For the moment, however, assume that the principal takes for granted that she’ll
prevail against the low-effort agent, and simply chooses LP to optimize against the
α-probability of a high-effort opponent. In such a circumstance, one can solve the
principal’s first-order condition to yield:
L∗P =
D
4b ·
(
µ
)2 (13)
where µ≡
(
α
√
cHA
cP
)
= µ− (1−α)
√
cHA
cP
< µ. (Under this proposed solution, it is easily
confirmed that the high-agent agent type strategy is interior so long as b≥ µ2
√
cHA .
)
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We still must check, however, whether the low-type agent would indeed be at
a corner solution when the principal expends the above proposed litigation level.
Equivalently we must determine whether: b D4b · (µ)2(
b ·0 + D4b ·
(
µ
)2)2
 ·D≤ cLA, (14)
a condition which is satisfied only if b ≤ µ2
√
cLA <
µ
2
√
cLA. Thus, this solution de-
scribed in (13) describes an equilibrium only for b ∈
[
µ
2
√
cHA ,
µ
2
√
cLA
)
≡ B2. Im-
portantly, it is not applicable when b∈
[
µ
2
√
cLA,
µ
2
√
cLA
)
≡ B3, a region in which the
principal’s optimal choice is always at a “kink” in her indirect payoff function. To
solve for the location of this kink, one must determine the lowest litigation level by
the principal that will make the low-effort agent’s non-negativity constraint bind-
ing. Equivalently, L∗P must satisfy:(
bL∗P
(b ·0 + L∗P)2
)
·D = cLA, (15)
which implies:
L∗P =
(
b ·D
cLA
)
. (16)
Using similar logic, it is possible to summarize the players’ strategies in inter-
val B1. Q.E.D.
5.2 Filing Stage Lemma
Lemma 5: The principal’s net expected gain from filing suit, RP(α), is continuous
and strictly decreasing in b, strictly decreasing in α in regions B4,B3,B2, and
flat in α in region B1.Moreover, RP(α) is strictly increasing in D, and strictly
decreasing in cP and F .
Proof: From the equilibrium probabilities and strategies derived in the text, the
expected indirect payoff functions of the players, conditional on litigation,
are illustrated in the table below. (Note that the two agent-types indirect
payoff functions are in actuality expected losses; they are therefore expressed
in the negative.)
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Interval piP (L∗P) −piHA (LH∗A ) −piLA(LL∗A )
b ∈ B4 D·µ
2·cP
4b
D·µ
b
[√
cHA − µ·c
H
A
4b
]
D·µ
b
[√
cLA− µ·c
L
A
4b
]
b ∈ B3 D·cPcLA ·
(
µ
√
cLA−b
)
+(1−α)D D
√
cHA
cLA
[
2−
√
cHA
cLA
]
D
b ∈ B2 D·µ
2·cP
4b +(1−α)D
D·µ
b ·
[√
cHA −
µ·cHA
4b
]
D
b ∈ B1 D ·
(
1− b·cP
cHA
)
D D
Since RP(α) ≡ piP (L∗P(α))−F, piecewise differentiation immediately yields the
results.
5.3 Effort Stage Lemma
Lemma 6: The agent’s net expected gain from expending productive effort, RA(γ),
is continuous and strictly increasing in γ ∀γ ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, RA(γ) is
strictly increasing in D and p, and strictly decreasing in φ.
Proof: By definition RA(γ)≡ γ
[
(1− p)piHA (LH∗A )− ppiLA(LL∗A )
]−φ where piHA (LH∗A )
and piLA(LL∗A ) are defined in the proof of Lemma 5. Examining each of the
four subregions separately and differentiating yields the desired result.
5.4 Equilibrium Propositions
Proposition 2 If b ∈ [0,b] and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exists a
unique sequential equilibrium in pure strategies with β∗ = 1, γ∗ = 1, and
α∗ = 1. The equilibrium litigation strategies correspond to those in the table
from Lemma 1, and depend on the precise value of b.
Proof: The proof of the proposition consists of an iterated dominance argu-
ment. First, we show that when b ∈ [0,b], it is strictly dominant for the principal
to file suit (γ = 1). Then, we show that when b ∈ [0,b], expending effort (i.e.,
β = α = 1) is the agent’s unique best response to the principal’s dominant strategy
γ = 1. We construct the proof using two lemmas:
Lemma A Assumption 1 implies that the principal will always file suit when b ∈
[0,b].
Proof: From Lemma 5 we know that RP(α) is decreasing in α in regions B2,
B3, and B4 and flat in α for region B1 thus it is sufficient to show that RP (1) ≥ 0
for each of the four regions. Note, however, that if α = 1 then region B3 is empty.
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In Region B4, RP (1) = Dc
H
A
4bcP −F ≥ 0 since b ≤
DcHA
4FcP . Clearly, in Region B2,
RP (1) =
DcHA
4bcP + (1−α)D−F ≥ 0. Finally, in Region B1 we have RP(1) = D(1−
bcp
cHA
)−F ≥ D(1− D4F )−F ≥ 0 if D≥ 2F which is guaranteed by Assumption 1.
Lemma B Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the agent’s unique best response to
γ = 1 is to expend productive effort when b ∈ [0,b].
Proof: First, note that if effort is the agent’s unique best response on the interval
b ∈ [0,b], then it must also be the unique best response for b ∈ [0,b] ⊂ [0,b]. (We
focus on the more restrictive case for purposes of later propositions). Begin once
again by concentrating solely on the interval B4 as defined in Lemma 1. Denote
b4(α)< b< b as the lower boundary of B4.We need to show that if b∈
[
b4(α),b
]
,
then RA(1)> 0.
Thus, suppose that b < b and thus the agent knows the principal will sue (γ =
1). The agent will expend effort if and only if:
φ≤ D ·µb ·
[
p ·
(√
cLA−
µcLA
4b
)
− (1− p) ·
(√
cHA −
µcHA
4b
)]
,
But since a high-effort agent suffers less in litigation than does a low-effort agent,
the above condition is always satisfied if the following sufficient condition is satis-
fied:
φ≤ (2p−1) ·D ·
[
µ
b
√
cLA−
µ2
4b2 c
L
A
]
≡ (2p−1) ·D · [Ψ(α)] .
Let the critical value φc that be the value of φ that satisfies this expression for every
possible value of α. To compute φc, we need to compute the value of α and b that
minimizes Ψ(α). To do this, note the following:
1. Ψ(α) is decreasing in b ∈ [b4(α), ¯b] for all values of α. To see this, simply
take the derivative of Ψ(α) with respect to b:
∂Ψ(α)
∂b =
∂
∂b
[
µ
b
√
cLA−
µ2
4b2 c
L
A
]
= µ
√
cLA
1
b3
(
µ
2
√
cLA−b
)
= µ
√
cLA
1
b3 (b4(α)−b)< 0
Thus, it is clear that Ψ(α) must reach its minimum value at b = b for the
relevant region.
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2. The minimum value of Ψ(α) evaluated at b = ¯b must occur at α = 1 which
follows from differentiating w.r.t. α and using Assumption 1.
3. Evaluating Ψ(1) at b = b yields:
φ ≤ (2p−1) ·D · [Ψ(1)|b=b]
φ ≤ (2p−1) ·D · µ
b
[√
cLA−
µ
4b
cLA
]
φ ≤ φc ≡ (2p−1) ·4F
√
cHA
cLA
[
1− F
D
√
cHA
cLA
]
Now, using Assumption 1, it is clear that the sharpest possible bound imposed by
φc is found when F = D2
(
cHA
cLA
)
. Thus, imposing this condition on the above yields:
φ≤ (2p−1) ·D · c
H
A
cLA
·
√
cHA
cLA
[
2− c
H
A
cLA
·
√
cHA
cLA
]
≤ (2p−1)D
which is the condition given in Assumption 2.
In all other regions (B1,B2,B3), it is significantly simpler to show that suit by
the principal makes it strictly dominant for the agent to expend effort. Indeed, in
these regions if the principal sues, a sufficient condition for the agent to expend
effort is:
φ≤ (2p−1) ·D
But this condition is implied the condition φ ≤ φc, and thus for all other Regions,
the agent’s best response to γ = 1 is to expend effort.
Proposition 3 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then there exists a
unique equilibrium in mixed strategies with β∗ ∈ (0,1), γ∗ ∈ (0,1) and beliefs
α∗ ∈ (0,1). The equilibrium litigation levels L ∗P , LL
∗
A and LH
∗
A correspond to
those in the first row of the table from Lemma 1.
Proof: We prove the proposition first by showing that there are no pure strategy
equilibria in Region II, and then by showing that the set of mixed strategy is a
singleton. We because there is a one-to-one mapping between α and β, we will
describe the equilibria solely in terms of α and γ.
Note first that there can never be an equilibrium in Region II that involves the
pure strategy γ = 0. Suppose there were; knowing that the principal would never
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sue, the agent would always shirk (α = 0). However, in Region II, the principal’s
best response to shirking by the agent is to sue always, which is a contradiction.
Similarly, there can be no Region II equilibrium that involves the pure strategy
γ = 1. Lemma B above ensures that the agent’s best response in Region II to suit
by the principal is to work hard (α = 1); but in Region II b > b, and thus the
principal’s best response to beliefs (α = 1) is not to sue, which is a contradiction.
An identical argument establishes that there can be no pure strategy equilibrium in
Region II involving β = α = 0 or β = α = 1.
Given that there are no pure-strategy equilibria in Region II, we need only
verify that the system
RA(γ) ≡ −φ + γ ·
[
p(q∗LD + c
L
AL
L∗
A )− (1− p)(q∗HD + cHA LH
∗
A )
]
= 0
RP(α) ≡ −F +[α ·q∗H +(1−α) ·q∗L] ·D− cPL∗P = 0
has a unique interior solution for α and γ. Inserting the functional forms for the
indirect utility functions yields:
−φ + γ ·
[
p
(
D ·µ
b
[√
cLA−
µ · cLA
4b
])
− (1− p)
(
D ·µ
b
[√
cHA −
µ · cHA
4b
])]
= 0
−F + D · cP
4b (µ)
2 = 0
Note that the second equation characterizes α uniquely. And, fixing α, RA(γ)
is linear in γ, and thus also has a unique solution in γ. Therefore, the equilibrium is
unique.
Proposition 4 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the agent’s equilibrium
effort strategy β∗ is decreasing in b, and the principal’s equilibrium filing
strategy γ∗ is increasing in b for all p ∈ [pˆ,1] where pˆ ∈ [12 ,1).
Proof: Solving the indifference condition for the principal yields the equilib-
rium value of α∗:
α∗ =
√
cLA−
√
4b·F ·cP
D(√
cLA−
√
cHA
) (17)
It is easily confirmed from (17) that α∗ ∈ (0,1) when b ∈ (b,b), and that α∗ is
strictly decreasing (from 1 to 0) in b over this interval. Inserting this solution into
the agent’s indifference condition yields:
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γ∗ = φ/D√
F
DbcP
[
2 ·
(
p
√
cLA− (1− p)
√
cHA
)
−
√
F
DbcP ·
(
pcLA− (1− p)cHA
)] (18)
Differentiation of (18) with respect to b directly yields the result reported in the
Proposition, that γ∗ is increasing in b for sufficiently large p. It is clear that γ∗ is
increasing in b if and only if the denominator is decreasing in b. We can re-express
the denominator as κ [2A−κC] , where κ =
√
F
DbcP , A =
(
p
√
cLA− (1− p)
√
cHA
)
,
and C =
(
pcLA− (1− p)cHA
)
. Thus, the denominator is decreasing in b if 2 ·
(
∂κ
∂b
)
·
[A−κC] < 0. But we know that ∂κ∂b < 0, so in order to prove the proposition, we
must show that A> κC for large enough p. Equivalently, we must show that:
b> F
D · cP
 pcLA− (1− p)cHA
p
√
cLA− (1− p)
√
cHA
2
for sufficiently large p. But we know that the term in the brackets is strictly de-
creasing in p, and thus the above condition is satisfied for all p if it is satisfied for
p = 12 . Evaluated at p =
1
2 our condition is b >
F
DcP (
√
cLA +
√
cHA )
2 which is not
always assured. However, evaluated at p = 1 our condition is
b> F · c
L
A
D · cP
which is assured by Assumption 1. Thus, there exists a pˆ ∈ [12 ,1] above which γ∗
is increasing in b.
Corollary 4.1 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the likelihood of a false
positive (high-effort defendant is found liable, i.e. q∗H) is decreasing in b.
Corollary 4.2 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the likelihood of a false
negative (low-effort defendant is not found liable, i.e. 1− q∗L) is increasing
in b.
Corollary 4.3 If b ∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the ex ante probability
of suit is increasing in b for sufficiently large p.
Corollary 4.4 If b∈ (b, ¯b) and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the unconditional prob-
ability plaintiff victory at trial does not vary with b.
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Proofs of Corollaries 4.1 - 4.4: In Region B4 we know q∗H = µ¯
√
cHA
2b and q
∗
L =
µ¯
√
cLA
2b . Note that α
∗ =
√
cLA−
√
4b·F·cP
D(√
cLA−
√
cHA
) we have µ¯ =√4bFDcP and δµ¯δb =√ FbDcP . Differ-
entiating q∗H and q∗L with respect to b now immediately yields Corollaries 4.1 and
4.2.
Corollary 4.3 follows immediately from Proposition 4. Finally, the uncondi-
tional probability of plaintiff victory is given by q¯ = α∗q∗H + (1−α∗)q∗L = µ¯
2cP
2b .
Differentiating with respect to b yields δq¯δb = 0.
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